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3: The meaning of honesty for research 
Piet J. M. Verschuren 
 
Introduction 
The last decade there is a long list of fraud and plagiarism in science, each time leading to an 
incidental superficial debate. However, despite the meaning of honesty is much wider than 
malversation, there is no thorough and structural debate among scientific researchers and 
methodologists about what this concept really means for science and for scientific research. 
Most of them may think that this is a matter of daily life, not of science, and that it at best can 
be regarded as a philosophical issue. This does not take away that it appears to be a crucial 
issue for researchers. Without honesty validity as the most important criterion of science, does 
not have a chance. Researchers encounter, wittingly or not, both many seductions and 
opportunities to be not fully honest, without being traced.  
In this contribution the concept of honesty is elaborated, not only as an humanitarian 
virtue, but especially as a methodologically relevant issue. First the meaning of the concept of 
honesty is scrutinized, revealing three components: openness, truthfulness and fairness. In the 
next three sections these three are elaborated respectively. I finish with an epilogue.  
The concept of honesty 
Let us take both as a metaphor and starting point the way honesty is used in daily life. Here 
we expect others to be open about what they think and do, and not to hide away things that we 
should know. So openness appears to be one aspect of honesty. However, people should not 
just be open about whatever they think or do. Their thoughts and deeds should also be 
truthful. And thirdly, we normally regard others as honest on the condition that they do not 
cheat or victimize us; they should be straightforward in their deeds. In sum honesty appears to 
be built up of three components: openness, truthfulness and fairness.  
What do these three components mean for scholars and researchers? For them openness 
means transparency in principle about everything they both do and find during the research. 
We might call this process and product openness respectively. The second component, 
truthfulness, is core business for scholars and researchers, as truth finding is a major concern 
of science. It means that they try to adhere to the facts, in what they do on the one hand, and 
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in what they say or write on the other. Here we make a difference between truth finding and 
truth speaking as two aspects of truthfulness. And finally fairness means that scholars and 
researchers come up to what the stakeholders of the research deserve, and that they don’t act 
at the cost of them.  
Whether the researcher should be honest very much depends on the questions honest (a) to 
whom, and (b) when during the research process. There are five categories of actors for whom 
the researcher’s honesty is to be considered, which categories may overlap one another or 
even coincide: (1) the contractor and/or financier, (2) the users/readers of the research report, 
(3) the research units, i.e. those who are studied, (4) other researchers in the field, (5) the 
authors, i.e. scholars and scientific researchers, of scientific publications that the researcher 
consulted. In the rest of this contribution we call these target groups.  
As to the question at which point in time the researcher should be honest there are three 
possibilities: (1) before, (2) whilst and (3) after the research is executed. As elaborated in 
section 2, in principle openness towards contractors or financiers takes place before, as to the 
research units whilst, and towards the users/readers and other researchers after the research. 
As we will see the answer to the questions of openness (a) why and (b) about what, highly 
differs for these five groups and three points in time. With the aid of these distinctions we can 
explore the links between the three components of honesty. There appears to be a kind of 
hierarchy between them (see Figure 1). 
 
First of all openness of the researcher may contribute to his truthfulness. It is difficult if not 
impossible for a researcher to be fully truthful without being open. Besides, openness is a 
precondition of fairness of a researcher. It is a task of the latter, put by either a financier 
(fundamental research) or a contractor (practice-oriented contract research), to produce 
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knowledge about the research object. So fairness asks for openness as to the results of his 
research project. The researcher also has to be open about what he exactly does or did during 
the preparation and execution of the research. This openness too is what all five target groups 
in some way or the other need for reasons to be explored in section 2. And finally, 
truthfulness may contribute to fairness: no fairness without a minimum of truthfulness. The 
reason again is that all five target groups deserve that the researcher is truthful. Seen from the 
point of view of the hierarchy here above, fairness is the crucial component of honesty, 
openness and truthfulness in large part being preconditions for it. 
The three components also may put limits to one another. For instance, openness of the 
researcher towards the persons studied (respondents, observed) may harm the validity of the 
data, because of biases such as social desirability and strategic behavior that easily can get 
into play. Thus openness puts limits to truthfulness in the sense of truth speaking. 
Truthfulness in the sense of truth finding may put limits to fairness. An example is a 
researcher who does not agree with the preferences of the contractor or financier as to the 
choice and formulation of the research questions to be answered. Truth finding may force him 
to stick to his research issue. Another instance of this type of limitation occurs if the results of 
the research do not come up to the expectations of the contractor or financier, or when the 
research findings are not in their advantage. And fairness may put limits to openness in cases 
where openness is not to the benefit of the target group. This may for instance occur when a 
contractor wants to hide away the research results from competitors. 
However, as to truthfulness in the sense of truth finding the researcher does not have any 
choice. As truth is the central concern of science, it has to prevail regardless the fairness or 
openness that may be demanded by the target groups. So, if users/readers deserve that the 
researcher comes up with a result A, whereas the latter is going to find B, he has to stick to B. 
In other words, fairness can’t prevail over truthfulness. Truth is the most crucial value of 
science, and contamination of it will further degrade science as a respectful institute in 
modern society.  
Openness 
In order to make clear the criterion of openness of a researcher as a component of his honesty, 
two questions are to be elaborated: (a) Openness why? (b) Openness about what? As to the 
questions of openness to whom and when, roughly the same goes as for honesty in general. 
Before answering the questions (a) and (b) we have to make a distinction between openness 
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for and openness about something. These are at the input and the output side of the researcher 
respectively. Openness for is what is called accessibility, whereas openness about can be 
labeled as transparency or open-heartedness. Accessibility turns out to be an aspect of 
truthfulness. In the rest of the present section the concept of openness in the sense of 
transparency is elaborated. 
Openness why 
As already mentioned, a first question to be answered is why the researcher should be open, at 
whose interest? Openness will make the researcher vulnerable to attacks, so it’s a legitimate 
question. There may be six reasons for openness of the researcher: (1) reasonableness, (2) 
doing justice, (3) getting the research and its findings accepted, (4) a right interpretation of the 
results by others, (5) control of the researcher, and (6) accumulation of knowledge. 
(1) Reasonableness: This criterion differs from fairness, as the latter has to do with nobleness 
and courtesy, whereas reasonableness is about a duty of the researcher to present the research 
results. Theory-oriented research normally is paid from taxes, so as a democratic principle the 
community must be able to take profit. And in case of a practice-oriented contract research 
there is a contractor who paid for it.   
(2) Doing justice: Normally a researcher starts with studying what is already known about his 
subject matter. The reasons are not to invent the wheel, and to be able to formulate 
informative and steering research questions (Verschuren, in press, chapter 10). However, the 
researcher is supposed to refer to these authors in his report. 
(3) Getting accepted the research and its results: One first concern of a researcher is to get the 
research proposal accepted by the financier or contractor. Next he has to get accepted the 
research results by the latter, as well as by other actual and potential users. For this it is 
important that the researcher is open about the research design (see below), about what he did 
during the research (logic in use, see below), and about the research findings.  
(4) Right interpretation: For those who want to make use of the research findings, i.e. 
contractors, users and other researchers in the field, it is important that they rightly interpret 
the contents of the research report. For this they should know how the research was designed 
and executed, the decisions that were taken, as well as the strategies and methods that were 
used. 
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(5) Control of the researcher: The subject of control are the acts and decisions of the 
researcher during the preparation, execution and reporting of the research project. This control 
has two aspects: (a) Control by others, like the users/readers of the research report and other 
researchers in the field. (b) Self control of the researcher. As to the latter, once the researcher 
realizes that he has to be open about what he did and what he did not do during the 
preparation and execution of the research, he not only forces himself to make the right 
methodological decisions during the research as much as possible. It is also an incentive to 
behave truthfully, the second criterion of honesty. An important aspect of this is to prevent 
him from malversation, such as fraud and plagiarism.  
(6) Accumulation of knowledge: Whenever other researchers or the researcher himself want 
to replicate the research, and or if they want to build on the results, they need to know all ins 
and outs of the research and its findings. 
Openness about 
A researcher in principle has to be open as to: (1) The research design, (2) his assumptions, 
viewpoints and expectations concerning the research issue, (3) the logic in use, (4) his own 
interests, (5) the research findings and (6) the theoretical sources he consulted. 
(1) The research design: The design of a research has to be subdivided into a conceptual and a 
technical part. In the conceptual design the problem to be solved is made clear and translated 
into the research goal and the research questions. He also defines the main concepts in the 
research questions in order to make clear these questions and to downsize purposively the 
project. In the technical design the research strategy is chosen and specified, as well as the 
methods for data gathering and data analysis (Verschuren, in press, chapter 10). Roughly the 
conceptual and the technical design represent the contexts of discovery and of justification 
respectively.  
(2) Assumptions, viewpoints and expectations: Every researcher has to assume several issues, 
for instance for being able to formulate informative and steering research questions 
(Verschuren in press, chapter 10). The users/readers not only should know these assumptions 
because these may in part determine the research findings. Besides this is important for 
understanding what the researcher actually did and the decisions he made. So the researcher 
has to make these assumptions explicit, and to present them in the research report. Mostly he 
also beforehand has ideas about the research object, as well as expectations about the answers 
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to the research questions. It is a good strategy to be open about these expectations in the 
research report, and then to see to what extend these are verified or falsified by the research, 
and to comment in the latter case.  
(3) Logic in use: Mostly the research is not executed exactly as it was designed. The reasons 
are unexpected happenings and pitfalls, as well as wrong viewpoints, expectations and 
assumptions that the researcher had in advance. Most researchers feel embarrassed, and won’t 
report things like these. Derksen, Korsten, and Bertrand (1988) who studied this phenomenon 
write: ‘…it appeared not to be simple to convince authors [the researchers they studied] that a 
fully open description of practical problems during the execution [of their research] would not 
be harmful for their image and that it neither would diminish their chances for [obtaining] 
future (contract) research’ [my translation from Dutch; PV] (Derksen et al., 1988, p. 15). 
Instead of reporting their logic in use, i.e. the way the researcher actually executed the 
research, including misconceptions, mistakes and wrong tracks that initially were followed, 
they tend to hide away these and report how the research ideally was executed, the 
reconstructed logic. However, instead of feeling ashamed the researcher should see these 
‘failures’ as insight in progress. Before the start they had good reasons to do things as they 
did, and they only can talk about failures grace to increased insight. Moreover, the logic in use 
is important for the user/reader for being able to rightly interpret and value the research 
findings. And finally it is also important for other researchers, so that they can learn from 
each other. For more information see Verschuren (in press, chapter 2). 
(4) Own interests: The researcher may, consciously or unconsciously, have personal interests 
in the research. He certainly should not be open about this towards the respondents and the 
observed, i.e. the research units, before and during the research. The reason is that this may 
influence their answers (respondents) and or their behavior (observed), thus causing invalid 
data. But openness towards financiers and contractors before the research starts may be at 
stake. The latter must be able to take this information into consideration, and to balance the 
revenues against the risks they take. Also afterwards when the research is finished, the 
researcher better is open about his interests by putting this information in the research report. 
This is to be preferred compared to a situation that the researcher tries to hide away this 
information, whilst later on it becomes apparent. In that case the readers/users might feel 
cheated. 
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(5) Research findings: It is a matter of reasonableness that the researcher is fully open as to 
the research findings. But what about intermediate findings halfway the project? Openness at 
this point may counteract truthfulness in the sense of truth finding, as these findings may 
influence the respondents and or the observed. And should the researcher also be open as to 
findings that he was not looking for, i.e. that are a byproduct? And is he obliged to be open 
about what he learned from a methodological point of view? As to the last two questions there 
are no predetermined answers. It depends on careful consideration of the situation at hand and 
balancing advantages and disadvantages. 
(6) Theoretical sources: The researcher must always be clear about the theoretical sources he 
consulted. If he fails to do so, this is an instance of plagiarism. For more information over the 
concept of openness and the role it plays in research methodology see Verschuren, in press, 
chapter 2. In sum this overview makes clear that the question whether the researcher should 
be open or not very much depends the answer to the questions why, about what, to whom, and 
when the openness is to take place. 
Truthfulness 
For the researcher to be open is an important part of honesty. However, as we saw this is not 
enough. To be open about whatever the researcher does or did, does not give any guarantee 
for his honesty. He should also be truthful, that is adhering to the facts. This has two aspects: 
(a) A strive for valid knowledge of reality, without distorting or contaminating it. (b) 
Reporting exactly what was found, no less, no more. In section 1 I labeled these as truth 
finding and truth speaking respectively. Another more current and less controversy labeling is 
veracity and frankness. 
(a) Veracity: As said the researcher’s attitude must be one of truth finding. However, truth is 
an aggravating concept. It is practically discarded in present day science, as the concept is 
difficult to define. What is that, truth? Is there just one single truth, or are there more truisms? 
How do/can we know what is true? Who decides what is true? Et cetera. For that reason 
scholars replaced truth by the concept of validity, defined as ‘correspondence with reality’. 
Unfortunately this in large part shifts the problem, because new questions arise: What is 
reality exactly? Whose reality? Who decides what is real, or is a matter of fact? The best way 
to counter this problem is to define validity operationally as the absence of distortion. There 
are numerous well known and methodologically extensively documented types of distortion, 
both from the researcher himself and from respondents and observed. As to the researcher, he 
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can make errors such as selective and distorted perception, tunnel view, biased viewpoint and 
going native. And respondents and observed make mistakes such as interviewer bias, social 
desirability, strategic behavior, response set et cetera. So, part of veracity is the tendency and 
the capacity of a researcher to avoid, eliminate, reduce or repair these distortions. 
However, this insufficiently covers the criterion of veracity. If it were sufficient there 
would be no need for the concept of truthfulness, and we could stick to the traditional 
criterion of validity. Firstly the biases mentioned all regard the context of justification (as 
opposed to the context of discovery; see below). This domain is about the question how the 
researcher is doing the research, as is elaborated in the technical design. And within this 
domain the biases mentioned only regard the measurement and observation process for which 
there is a lot of sound methodological regulation. Besides, a researcher has to make decisions 
and choices that are not bound to methodological procedures, rules and criteria, i.e. so called 
‘free decisions’. Examples are the choice of a theoretical framework, of definitions of the 
main concepts in the research questions, the way the researcher downsizes the project, the 
choice of assumptions that he makes, et cetera. Here decisions and choices much more depend 
on the person of the researcher, which stresses the importance of his veracity. 
The same goes for the context of discovery, with its main question of what the researcher 
is studying. Roughly this regards the goal of the research and the research questions to be 
answered, i.e. the conceptual design of the research. Many decisions and choices to be made 
here also are or should be the subject of veracity. For instance, the researcher must not only 
avoid that he is influenced by his own interests, by his fixed ideas about the research object, 
and by the interests and/or fixed ideas of stakeholders of the research. Besides he must be 
accessible for relevant input; the concept of openness for information. By allowing some 
types of information and resisting others, the researcher is able to distort a right view of the 
object of research. This contradicts the well known methodological criterion of researcher 
independency. The acting of the researcher should be independent of himself as a person and 
of others, i.e. respondents, financiers, contractors, users, or other stakeholders, as well as other 
researchers in the field, who might influence him. As a consequence he must be open to all 
relevant information.  
(b) Frankness: Truthfulness of the researcher is not only a matter of truth finding or veracity. 
He also must be truthful in how he communicates about both the way he executes the research 
and what he finds, the case of truth speaking. This communication should be frankly, without 
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distorting the information, without hiding something away and without adding something. He 
also should frankly report his doubts if there are any. And especially he should be open as to 
the logic in use. Synonyms for frankness that also represent the aspect of honesty that is 
envisaged here are open-heartedness, uprightness and integrity. It stands to reason that 
openness is or should be part of frankness: no frankness without openness. However, the 
reverse is not true, as one can be open without being frank or open-hearted.  
Fairness 
Fairness is about taking into account what others, i.e. target groups and the world we live in, 
deserve. As revealed in the first three sections openness and truthfulness are deserved (or 
should be deserved) by target groups. So lack of openness and truthfulness means a lack of 
fairness anyway. However, besides these so called errors of omission there may be also errors 
of commission as to fairness; the researcher may act to the detrimental of others. From this it 
follows that he must respect their integrity, not distorting, undermining, victimizing, affecting 
or violating them, and must act in their spirit. The errors of omission as to fairness follow 
directly from sections 2 and 3. In the present section we will concentrate on the active 
component of fairness, to be elaborated for each of the five target groups mentioned before. 
For practical reasons we concentrate on the main issues, as examples of what fairness of the 
researcher may mean. Before starting the reader must realize that most of what will be said 
about users/readers in point 2 here after, also counts for financiers and contractors. 
(1) Financiers and contractors: Fairness in the sense of respecting the concerns of the latter 
especially is at stake in the conceptual design of the research, i.e. analyzing and defining the 
problem to be solved, and translating it into research questions. As to the first, the researcher 
should be straightforward in carrying out a problem analysis resulting in an adequate 
definition of the problem to be solved. Paradoxically enough this may mean that the 
researcher does not follow the financier’s or contractor’s demands. This despite the fact that 
this can bring him easily into a dilemma: not following the financier or contractor may mean 
loss of finances for the research project. The reasons for straightforwardness are that miscon-
ceptions of financiers and contractors as to the problem to be solved are very normal, and that 
problem analysis asks for sound methodological skills (Rouwette & Franco, 2015; Vennix & 
Rouwette, 2009; Verschuren, in press, chapter 13). 
Partly because of ignorance, partly as a consequence of the dilemma above, and partly as 
an instance of false fairness, many researchers as a rule follow the financier or contractor. For 
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instance, in an article on this topic Raaijmakers (2009) writes: ‘… there will be no 
insurmountable disagreements between contractor and researcher, for the simple reason that 
mostly the researcher will conform to the frame of reference of the contractor’ [my translation 
from the Dutch; PV] (Raaijmakers, 2009, p.169). However, as is demonstrated, honesty of the 
researcher asks for his critical attitude. 
(2) Users/readers of the results: Here fairness regards primarily the research results. These 
results, or simply reading the research report, should not embarrass the users/readers. Or, at 
least, they should be warned when reading might be embarrassing. Fairness to the users also is 
a matter of accessibility of the research results. This is especially the case with most research 
at universities, which in large part is paid from taxes. So reasonableness asks for free access 
to the results. This is exactly what Merton (1942) meant with his criterion of communalism 
(Merton, 1973, see the epilogue here after). This idea may explain an explosion of open 
access journals in the last few years. 
(3) The research units, i.e. respondents and observed: Fairness of the researcher here first of 
all means that he openly tells them beforehand what kind of data he is looking for, and how he 
is going to find, gather or produce these data. For instance, in an experiment or random 
clinical trial (RCT) the test persons should know in advance what the object of research is, 
and whether they will be in the experimental or in the control group. This is an instance of the 
well known criterion of informed consent. In addition, respondents and observed should know 
whether the results can be harmful or can be used against them. 
(4) Other researchers: Firstly fairness towards other researchers means that they not only must 
be able to replicate the research for testing purposes. They must also have an opportunity to 
build on these findings. Secondly fairness means that they as much as possible must be hold 
back from making the same mistakes or from following the same unfruitful tracks as the 
researcher initially might have done. This demand in large part comes down to openness 
about the logic in use of a project. 
(5) Authors who were consulted: In modern society knowledge and insight is regarded to be 
owned by the producers. So borrowing their ideas without referring to their names and 
publications is regarded as theft, and is labeled as plagiarism. 
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Epilogue 
When Merton in 1942 formulated his CUDOS norms these were limited to four criteria to be 
fulfilled by scholars and scientific researchers: communalism, universalism, disinterestedness 
and organized skepticism (Merton, 1973). With communalism he meant that the results of 
science must be regarded as a collective good, so in principle they must be openly accessible 
for everybody. And the norm of universalism says that the work of scientists must be 
evaluated equally, irrespective of their religion, race or ethnicity. 
Since the eighties of the last century science gradually became more commercial, which 
may have inspired Habermas to add one criterion: honesty of the researcher (Habermas, 
1990). So he opted for the CUDOSH norms, with the H of honesty. However, our analysis 
makes clear that this addition is less complementing than it seems at first sight. Two out of 
Merton’s four criteria appear to partly cover the concept of honesty. These are communalism 
and disinterestedness, the first and third of the CUDOS norms. Merton’s communalism 
appears to be the equivalent of openness about the research findings. And his claim of 
disinterestedness of the researcher turns out to be one of the preconditions of veracity. 
Without disinterestedness truth finding is difficult if not impossible. 
These overlaps do not take away that Habermas’ merit is that he was the first to put the 
issue of honesty of scholars and researchers in the front light. We now know that there are not 
only humanitarian but also methodological arguments for it. Honesty is all the more 
methodologically crucial as a researcher in general has many opportunities and seductions for 
forgetting to be open, truthful or fair, wittingly or not. Tragically enough one can even say 
that the more methodologically qualified, the more opportunities a researcher has to do so 
without being detected. From this it follows that we must leave behind a widely adhered and 
misguiding truism that for adequate and fruitful research we just need a skillful researcher. He 
also must be open, truthful and fair. 
This conclusion gives me an opportunity to refer to my highly recognized colleague Jac 
Vennix. For many years we worked together on research methodology, talking about 
fundamental methodological issues. It revealed a common basic view on science and 
scientific research. I’m sure he will appreciate my final conclusion above. This idea is further 
supported by the fact that in all those years I have got to know Jac as an open, truthful and fair 
person. 
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